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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V . 
BARTON V. MCFARLAND 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20101031-CA 
INTRODUCTION 
The State, in its brief, succinctly contends that the trial court did not err because it 
allowed defendant an opportunity to present evidence in mitigation. However, the trial 
court failed to provide Mr. McFarland with an opportunity to meaningfully respond 
because it had already rendered a decision before the parties made any argument. This 
pre-decision violated due process. The State's brief did not adequately address this point. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE STATE'S ARGUMENT MINIMIZES THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT 
THAT TRIAL COURTS MUST CONSIDER ALL EVIDENCE PRIOR TO 
MAKING A DECISION 
In response to Mr. McFarland's argument that trial courts must consider all the 
evidence prior to making a decision, the State responds that "while the judge did express 
his opinion at the outset, he allowed Defendant and his counsel to both try to change his 
mind." Appellee's Br. at 11. 
An essential component of due process is that a defendant be afforded a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard before the court makes its decision. See, eg., Green v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 301, 303 n.l, 305, 5 L. Ed. 2d 670, 81 S. Ct. 653 (1961) ("Trial 
judges should leave no room for doubt that the defendant has been issued a personal 
invitation to speak prior to sentencing."); State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 854-55 (Utah 
1994) ("a defendant is entitled to due process protections during sentencing to prevent 
procedural unfairness. Fundamental principles of procedural fairness in sentencing 
require that a defendant have the right to examine and challenge the accuracy and 
reliability of the factual information upon which his sentence is based"); United States v. 
Cardenas, 917 F.2d 683, 684 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Because punishment, like medicine, is 
something a person likes to know about before it is administered, notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard at sentencing are significant rights"); Ex Parte Barry, 109 S.W.3d 
510, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ("an inmate is entitled to a meaningful opportunity to 
be heard by the Board before it makes a decision concerning his release"); Group Health 
Plan, Inc. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 344 F.3d 753, 761 n. 3 (8th Cir. 2003) ("parties [must] 
have an adequate opportunity to be heard before the district court makes its decision") 
(internal quotation omitted). The legal treatise Ruling Case Law explained this common 
law concept well: 
It is a fundamental principle of the common law, founded injustice and sound 
policy, that no judgment or decree affecting the person or property of an individual 
shall be valid, unless notice, actual or constructive, is given to the individual 
whose rights are to be affected. Every man is entitled to an opportunity to be heard 
in a court of law upon every question involving his rights or interests, before he is 
affected by any judicial decision of the question. Such notice and opportunity to be 
heard are essential elements of due process of law, and the sentence or judgment 
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of a court without hearing the party or giving him an opportunity to be heard is not 
a judicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled to any respect in any other 
tribunal. 
Gray v. Hall, 265 P. 246, 254 (Cal. 1928); Morley v. Morley, 230 P. 645, 646-47 (Wash. 
1924) (citing 15 R.C.L. "Judgments," p. 846). 
Utah law specifically requires the court to hear evidence, particularly in 
mitigation, before it makes its decision: 
At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) (2011). 
As cited in Defendant's opening brief, the court must provide a defendant an 
opportunity to present evidence in mitigation before it announces its sentence. Utah R. 
Crim. Pro. 22(a); see also State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) ("The due 
process clause of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a sentencing 
judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in 
fixing a sentence."); State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, \ 23, 79 P.3d 937 (stating that the 
"court is responsible" for "affirmatively provid[ing] the defense an opportunity to address 
the court and present reasonably reliable and relevant information in the mitigation of a 
sentence."). 
Florida requires its courts to proceed in the following fashion at sentencing in 
death penalty cases: 
First, the trial judge should hold a hearing to: a) give the defendant, his counsel, 
and the State, an opportunity to be heard; b) afford, if appropriate, both the State 
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and the defendant an opportunity to present additional evidence; c) allow both 
sides to comment on or rebut information in any presentence or medical report; 
and d) afford the defendant an opportunity to be heard in person. Second, after 
hearing the evidence and argument, the trial judge should then recess the 
proceeding to consider the appropriate sentence. 
Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 690 (Fla. 1993). See also, United States v. Wilson, 614 
F.3d 219, 222 n. 1 (6th Cir. 2010) ("the use of a pre-prepared sentencing opinion in lieu of 
an oral recitation creates the worrisome impression that the district court's decision was 
etched in stone before the parties had the opportunity to be heard. If that were the case, 
the procedural safeguards enshrined in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i) would 
be drained of meaning. ... [W]e observe that a final sentencing decision should not be 
reached until after the hearing has been completed"). In the Spencer case, the judge had 
already prepared an order announcing a death sentence prior to the actual sentencing 
proceeding. Spencer, 615 So. 2d at 689. While Spencer's process applies specifically to 
death penalty cases, the concepts remain the same. Before a court imposes sentence, it 
should allow all the parties to speak and present evidence, then it should make its 
decision after having heard the evidence fully. 
While the court in this case did not announce its final decision until after all 
parties had spoken, the court erroneously manifested its intention to send Mr. McFarland 
to prison before the defendant had a meaningful opportunity to present evidence in 
mitigation. The danger in this case is that the court clearly indicated that it had already 
made its decision. Then it simply listened to the parties and then reiterated its earlier 
decision. The court said as much, when after the parties had spoken the court said that its 
"decision earlier is the right one." R. 59:11. 
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The State's contention that the timing does not matter—so long as the court listens 
to the parties' arguments—opens up a range of unconscionable problems. Courts could 
affirmatively make their decisions prior to the hearing then engage in pro forma 
sentencing proceedings. This would satisfy due process, under the State's analysis, 
because the court at least held the hearing and let the parties work to "convince him 
otherwise." However a hearing like this clearly violates due process since a defendant 
should appear before a judge who is open to considering all the evidence prior to making 
his judgment. We ask jurors not to form opinions until they have heard all of the 
evidence. See ModelJury Instructions, 2d ed., CR 101-104. It would be counter-intuitive, 
and unconstitutional, to say in the trial setting that jurors can form an opinion of guilt and 
let the defense work to convince them otherwise. In the same fashion, the trial court 
should not have pre-formed an opinion about which sentence to impose and should only 
make that decision based on a fair and complete consideration of all of the evidence. 
Additionally, if judges may pre-form opinions before hearing the evidence, then the 
purpose and necessity of hearings would be completely eviscerated. Judges should not 
have to have their "minds changed" during a hearing—they should fairly and impartially 
consider the evidence before making that decision. 
The State's brief leaves the impression that since the court allowed both parties an 
opportunity to speak, that the hearing comported with due process. However, the critical 
component to the analysis is that the court pre-announced its decision—even telling Mr. 
McFarland that it would send him to prison—before the hearing actually took place. In 
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essence, the sentencing hearing constituted only a pro forma attempt to comply with the 
requirements of due process, but it was not a meaningful opportunity. 
Defendant submits the remainder of his arguments as outlined in his opening brief 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's announcement of its inteaded sentence prior to the presentment of 
evidence constituted a violation of due process and this Court should reverse the 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this i 4 dety of J U L W 2011. 
P. NEWTON 
or the Defendant/Appellant 
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